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Abstract 
In this paper we relate the economics of labeling genetically modified (GM) products to the 
theory of grading and minimum quality standards. The model represents three stages in the 
supply chain (farm production, marketing handlers, and final users) and allows explicitly for the 
accidental co-mingling of non-GM products at the marketing stage. Regulation takes the form of 
a threshold level of purity for non-GM products. The paper also presents a novel demand 
specification for differentiated GM and non-GM products that is particularly useful in our 
stochastic framework. First, we find that if the threshold purity level for non-GM products is too 
strict, this necessarily leads to the disappearance of non-GM product from the market. Second, we 
show that some quality standard is in the interest of farmers as well. Indeed, we show that the 
standard that is optimal from the perspective of producers is actually stricter than what is optimal 
for consumers and for societal welfare. We conclude with comparative statics effects that 
illustrate the impact of the model’s parameters on market equilibrium and on the welfare-
maximizing regulatory standard. 
 
Key Words:  biotechnology, grading, identity preservation, food labeling, minimum quality 
standards, regulation, uncertainty.  
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Introduction 
The one billionth acre of genetically modified (GM) crop was planted in 2005, only ten years 
after this technology was first introduced.  Whereas this milestone exemplifies the widespread 
and fast diffusion of a tremendously promising and radical innovation, there continues to be 
public resistance and opposition to GM food (Evenson and Santaniello, 2004).  Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the European Union (EU), where public opposition first led to a regulatory 
impasse with serious trade implications (Pew Initiative, 2005) and finally resulted in a new, 
complex, and stringent regulatory system centered on the notions of GM food labeling and 
traceability.1  In the EU, all foods produced from GM ingredients must now be labeled, regardless 
of whether or not the final products contain DNA or proteins of GM origin. Such labels will have 
to state: “This product contains genetically modified organisms,” or “This product has been 
produced from genetically modified [name of organism].”  To avoid carrying a GM label, a high 
level of purity is required: the tolerance level for the presence of “authorized” GM products is set 
at 0.9%. This mandatory labeling is supplemented by traceability requirements, meant to facilitate 
monitoring of unintended environmental effects and to help enforce accurate labeling.  
This drive toward GM labeling, mirrored in many other countries, is emerging as a key 
policy response to the introduction of GM products. This effect contributes to the ongoing 
transformation of the agricultural industry from one that produces largely “homogenous” 
commodities into one that eventually may be characterized by differentiated goods. Meeting the 
demand for differentiated food products requires a system that can credibly deliver such 
differentiated products to end users. Previous work in this area has centered on the notion of 
“grading” agricultural commodities. Grading of products and government inspections have long 
been used in agricultural markets in pursuit of a variety of objectives (Dimitri, 2003). In this 
setting it is useful to separate regulations that aim at improving the health safety of the food 
                                                        
1
 This became effective in April 2004. See European Union (2004) for more details.  
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supply from quality regulations that have mostly an “informational” root vis-à-vis the quality of 
the good as perceived by consumers (Gardner, 2003). The latter are more germane when 
considering the issue of GM labeling (health safety considerations are arguably best dealt with at 
the approval stage of GM products). Specifically, the introduction of GM products that some 
consumers deem undesirable means that the corresponding non-GM pre-innovation traditional 
product attains, for these consumers, the status of a “superior” product.  
Tapping the emerging demand for non-GM food is hampered by the fact that the GM and 
corresponding non-GM products appear identical and cannot be distinguished visually. If the 
superior non-GM product cannot be distinguished from the inferior GM one, the pooled 
equilibrium likely to emerge in the market would display the attributes of Akerlof’s (1970) 
“lemons” model; that is, it would contain too high a proportion of low-quality product. A credible 
labeling and certification system, distinguishing GM from non-GM products in the marketplace, 
would clearly be desirable. Whether such a system should take the form of mandatory labeling of 
the (inferior-quality) GM products, as with the new EU regulation, is of course highly 
questionable (Crespi and Marette, 2003; Lapan and Moschini, 2004). The problem here is not 
simply one of asymmetric information (i.e., the seller has private information that may be 
valuable to buyers, and labeling requirements may force disclosure of such information) but the 
fact that the information to be disclosed to consumers needs to be “produced” through an ad hoc 
process. This is because the product is handled a number of times as it moves from farmers to 
consumers, and the possibility for (inadvertent) mixing of distinct products exists at each stage 
(Bullock and Desquilbet, 2002).  Thus, to satisfy the underlying differentiated demand for GM 
and non-GM products, costly identity preservation (IP) activities are necessary, and such 
activities obviously need to be carried out by the suppliers of the superior (non-GM) product.  
Thus, accepting the need for a GM labeling system still leaves open the question of what 
features it should have from an economic perspective. In addition to the “voluntary” versus 
“mandatory” question, mentioned earlier, a critical element concerns what it means to be “non-
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GM.”  Because of the aforementioned need for extensive IP measures at various production and 
marketing stages, it is becoming apparent that 100% purity is simply not attainable.2  Thus, a 
critical element of emerging GM labeling regulations concerns the “threshold’ or “tolerance” 
level—i.e., the maximum level of impurity that is admissible in food while still allowing a claim 
of non-GM. No uniformity appears to be emerging across countries on this matter. As mentioned, 
the EU has set an extremely strict threshold level of 0.9%. Australia and New Zealand have an 
almost-as-strict tolerance level of 1% (but, unlike in the EU, these countries exempt highly 
refined products, such as vegetable oils, from the labeling requirements). Japan and South Korea, 
on the other hand, have opted for laxer standards (e.g., Carter and Gruere, 2003). Their tolerance 
levels are 5% and 3%, respectively, and only apply to the main ingredients of a food item (top 
three ingredients in Japan and top five ingredients in South Korea). 
The question of the appropriate threshold level for non-GM products can be viewed as 
the establishment of a government-mandated “minimum quality standard” (MQS). The seminal 
work of Leland (1979) exemplified the consequences of Akerlof’s (1970) lemon problem and 
showed that an MQS can improve the welfare attributes of an otherwise unregulated competitive 
system. Gardner (2003) draws the links between this and related work for the assessment of food 
quality standards. In this paper we wish to pursue in detail the question of setting an MQS for 
non-GM food, as attempted by the GM labeling regulations discussed in the foregoing. Our 
analysis relies on an explicit market equilibrium model that captures the stylized attribute of GM 
innovation. Specifically, we develop a model that has the following basic elements: (i) 
heterogeneous consumers with preferences over the differentiated goods (GM and non-GM 
products); (ii) producers (farmers) for whom GM product provides an efficiency gain; (iii) 
middlemen, who purchase from farmers, grade and label goods, and resell them to consumers; 
and (iv) a government, which identifies the “optimal” grading system (i.e., the GM tolerance 
                                                        
2
 Episodes of accidental GM contamination support this conclusion, including the high-profile Starlink and 
Prodigene cases (Taylor and Tick, 2003) and, more recently, the Bt10 corn mix-up (Herrera, 2005).  
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level). In the framework of analysis that we develop, uncertainty plays a critical role, and the 
need for IP activities to keep GM and non-GM products sufficiently segregated in the production 
and marketing system is explicitly addressed.  
 
Background: Quality, Grading, and Minimum Quality Standards 
Modeling of MQSs started with Leland (1979), who considered a market with the kind of 
asymmetric information introduced by Akerlof (1970). The MQSs in question parallel those of 
“licensing” in a profession (e.g., physicians). Without any mechanism, it is shown that in a 
market with such informational asymmetries the equilibrium under-provides quality. MQSs can 
increase welfare. Leland also shows that the MQSs chosen by a professional group or industry 
tend to exceed the socially optimal level. This quintessential market-power result highlights a 
distinctive feature of models in this area, where an MQS is typically presumed to work by 
eliminating from the market all products with quality below the set level. By raising quality, an 
MQS also reduces supply, and this effect can allow the exploitation of a degree of market power. 
Consumers do not uniformly gain by the establishment of an MQS (some are better off and some 
are worse off as a result).3   
Most of the work on MQSs has been carried out in imperfectly competitive settings. 
When consumers differ in terms of their willingness to pay for quality, and in the vertical product 
differentiation (VPD) framework, imperfectly competitive firms may have an incentive to 
increase quality diversification in order to soften price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). 
Given that, Ronnen (1991) uncovers another reason for MQSs to have positive welfare effects: by 
limiting the range of admissible quality differentiation, the ensuing price competition is more 
aggressive. He shows that an MQS can in fact make all consumers better off, and social welfare 
                                                        
3
  Shapiro (1983) presents related results and endogenizes the supply of the various qualities. 
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can be improved by the standard.4 But Valletti (2000) finds that such conclusions depend heavily 
on the Bertrand-type competition that is presumed for the second stage of the game and he 
concludes that an MQS is not welfare-increasing under Cournot competition. Ronnen’s 
conclusions have also been questioned by Scarpa (1998), who shows that an MQS can actually 
reduce industry profit and welfare when more than two firms operate in the market. One of the 
messages here is that “excessive” competition can represent a negative incentive to supply high-
quality goods.5 
In the agricultural economics literature, MQSs were analyzed by Bockstael (1984), who 
shows that under perfect competition and with observable quality an MQS would lead to welfare 
losses. This is because an MQS, in that setting, simply amounts to an arbitrary restriction on an 
otherwise undistorted competitive model (as also noted by Shapiro, 1983). Yet, another strand of 
the agricultural economics literature discusses MQSs in the context of studying the economics of 
“grading” agricultural commodities. Basically, grading is understood as identifying ranges of 
qualities for which different markets (and different prices) arise. Earlier contributions are 
reviewed by Bockstael (1987), who distinguishes between the contexts of perfect information and 
of quality uncertainty. Some of the connections between grading and MQSs are informally 
discussed in a recent paper by Gardner (2003), who emphasizes the usefulness of distinguishing 
regulations that aim at (i) improving the health safety of the food supply from (ii) quality 
regulations that have mostly an “informational” root vis-à-vis the quality of the good as perceived 
by consumers. He also notes the traditional view that grades developed by the USDA usually 
serve two distinct purposes: (a) to facilitate long-distance trade; and (b) to differentiate products 
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 His model, as in much of this literature, relies on the common linear-in-quality utility unit demand 
specification introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978), with the further restriction of a uniform distribution 
of consumer types. 
 
5
  This view is also articulated by Maxwell (1998) in a different context. Specifically, he shows that, in the 
presence of an activist regulator, an innovative firm correctly anticipates that the MQS will be raised after 
an innovation. This reduces the profitability of new discoveries, thereby reducing the incentive to innovate, 
which may reduce welfare. 
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at the producer level. Within this taxonomy, the concerns of the present paper are with points (ii) 
and (b). 
A major distinction between the notions of grading and of MQSs is that the former 
envision marketing of all product qualities, whereas the presumption in the latter is that an MQS 
excludes some qualities from the market. MQSs thus narrowly construed clearly do not apply to a 
number of realistic cases in agriculture. Organic standards set by the USDA, for example, identify 
the minimum quality (percentage of organic ingredients) necessary to belong to one of three 
organic product categories (“100 percent organic,” “organic,” and “made with organic 
ingredients”). Clearly, products failing an upper category can be marketed in the lower one, and 
products failing the lowest organic category standard can still be marketed as conventional 
products (and thus are not excluded from the market). The case of non-GM labeling that we posit 
in this paper is very much of the same nature: a product failing the non-GM standard can still be 
marketed as a GM product. That standards do not always prohibit marketing of lower qualities 
was noted by earlier studies. Bockstael (1984), for example, also considers the case in which 
substandard product is diverted into a pre-existing secondary market.6  In what follows we will 
maintain this feature as an integral part of the model. Indeed, what gives rise to the potential for 
product differentiation in this setting (i.e., heterogeneous preferences for quality) also directly 
specifies the nature of the market for the lower standard product and specifies the substitution 
relationship between the higher-quality and the lower-quality products. In what follows, we 
describe an explicit model for the analysis. 
 
The Model 
In this model we consider three market stages: (1) the farm level, where agricultural output of 
either GM or non-GM type is produced; (2) the marketing level, which uses agricultural products 
                                                        
6
  Considering such a secondary market makes no difference as a MQS necessarily reduces welfare in her 
model. 
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as input in a chain that involves assembly, transportation, processing, and distribution, yielding 
food products that can be sold to consumers; and (3) the consumer level, where final users have 
the choice (in general) of GM and non-GM products. In this setting, therefore, there are two 
output products at the farm level, and two output products at the marketing level, so that we need 
to distinguish four prices. The superscripts 0  and 1  will denote the farm and consumer levels, 
respectively, and the subscripts g  and n  will denote GM and non-GM products, respectively. 
Thus: 
0
np  is the farm-gate price of a non-GM product; 
0
gp  is the farm-gate price of the GM product; 
1
np  is the consumer price of the good certified as “non-GM”; and  
1
gp  is the consumer price of the GM good (unlabeled). 
The model that we develop envisions a competitive farm sector with a standard upward-sloping 
supply curve.7  The marketing level is also modeled as competitive and operating under constant 
returns to scale and, in addition to the standard marketing services (e.g., storage, transportation, 
processing, …), here it also provides the IP activities necessary for non-GM product. The final 
consumption level displays differentiated demand for GM and non-GM products, which is 
modeled as arising from preference heterogeneity. The consumer level displays the property that 
the GM product is a weakly inferior substitute for the non-GM products, as in Lapan and 
Moschini (2004).  
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  This standard property can be rationalized as arising because of the inelastic supply of land at the 
aggregate level, which translates into an upward-sloping supply of land at the level of a particular 
agricultural industry.  
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Farm Level 
We consider a sector in which many competitive farmers produce both GM and non-GM 
products. The GM product is appealing to farmers because it decreases production costs. This is a 
property of so-called first-generation GM traits, as illustrated by herbicide-resistant crops (Falck-
Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000). To represent this 
process in the most efficient way, we postulate that the GM product offers a constant unit cost 
savings equal to 0δ > . Thus, if gQ  and nQ  denote the aggregate production of GM and non-GM 
products, respectively, the aggregate cost function of the farm sector is written as 
( )g n nC Q Q Qδ+ + , where ( )C ⋅  is a convex function (i.e., the marginal cost ( )C ′ ⋅  is 
increasing). Let ( )S ⋅  denote the inverse of the marginal cost function, that is, the function 
satisfying 1( ) ( )S C− ′⋅ = ⋅ . Then the aggregate supplies of the two farm-level products, arising 
from competitive profit maximization at the farm level, are 
(1) 
0
0
( )
g
n n
Q
Q S p δ
= ⎫⎪⎬
= − ⎪⎭
 if 0 0( )n gp p δ− >  
(2) 
0( )
0
g g
n
Q S p
Q
⎫= ⎪⎬
= ⎪⎭
  if 0 0( )n gp p δ− <  
(3) 
0
0 0
( )
0, ( ) and 0, ( )
n g g
n g g g
Q Q S p
Q S p Q S p
⎫+ = ⎪⎬⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∈ ∈ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎭
 if 0 0( )n gp p δ− =  
The cost savings δ  is taken as exogenously given.  Thus, in any equilibrium where both 
GM and non-GM are produced and consumed, it will be the case that 0 0n gp p δ= +  (i.e., the farm-
level “premium” for the non-GM product simply compensates for a production cost difference). 
Also, note that, in such an equilibrium, the supply of either product is infinitely elastic, although 
clearly total supply is upward sloping. 
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Marketing Sector 
We consider a generic middleman, referred to as “processor,” who performs all the relevant 
marketing functions between the farm level and the consumer level. The processor buys product 
of a declared type from the farmer, moves it through a distribution chain, and sells it to 
consumers. Because farmers can produce GM and/or non-GM products, any one processor may 
be buying either product from any one farmer.  
A fundamental part of the problem at hand is the possibility of the unintended co-
mingling of GM and non-GM products, which necessitates the use of IP activities that can control 
such contamination. As the good moves through the production and marketing sector, there is a 
positive probability of contamination. This contamination can occur during production, storage, 
transportation, or elsewhere along the chain. It may occur because of cross-pollination during 
primary production, because employees are careless during the post-harvest handling process, 
because containers are not perfectly cleaned, and so forth. Our model is agnostic as to where 
contamination takes place. We simply presume that some IP activities need to be carried out 
before a non-GM product can be sold as such to the consumer, and for simplicity we model IP as 
part of the marketing level.  
Specifically, we assume that any lot of non-GM farm product that the processor 
purchases will, during the processing and distribution process, become contaminated with some 
(perhaps only trace amounts of) GM product, and that this “impurity” level has a given 
distribution function. Thus, for each non-GM lot that the processor purchased and then processed, 
we define as is  the impurity level of lot i (i.e., the fraction of GM material in the final output). 
Naturally, [ ]0,1is ∈ . The density and distribution functions of is , which are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), are written as ( )f s  and ( )F s , respectively. 
Because 
 10 
(4) ( ) ( )
0
s
F s f y dy= ∫  
then ( )F s  represents the probability that a given lot has an impurity level no higher than s , and 
given a large number (continuum) of i.i.d. lots, it also represents the proportion of non-GM output 
that has an impurity level no higher than s  when it reaches the marketing stage.8 
 We conceive of marketing activities as supplied by a competitive sector displaying 
constant returns to scale at the aggregate level. This presumption may be viewed as an 
oversimplified representation of the many activities that take place between the farm gate and 
final consumption, but it is defensible if there are no major barriers to entry in the supply of 
marketing and processing services. With that, we represent the compensation of the activities 
incurred at the marketing level (except for IP) in terms of a constant unit cost 0η >  that is 
incurred for any unit of farm output that is handled (regardless of its type). Furthermore, for any 
unit of farm-level non-GM output that is handled, processors also need to supply segregation and 
IP, and thus also incur a constant unit IP cost 0σ > . 
 
Consumer Demand 
Underlying the perceived need for costly IP, and for government regulation, there must be 
willingness to pay for non-GM product on the part of at least some consumers. As discussed 
earlier, the premise is that, whereas consumers never prefer the GM product when the equivalent 
non-GM good is available at the same price, some consumers are willing to pay something to 
avoid the GM product. Thus, as in previous studies (e.g., Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Lapan and 
Moschini, 2004), we model GM and non-GM products as “vertically differentiated” products. A 
demand specification that has proven useful in this context is the unit demand model of Mussa 
                                                        
8
 It is also true that, in this setting, some GM-free product may “contaminate” the GM good, but we will 
ignore this possibility and assume that the GM product, when it reaches the marketing stage, is pure GM. 
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and Rosen (1978), where consumers’ differing valuation of quality is captured by an individual 
taste parameter. In what follows, we adapt this framework to capture the essence of the problem 
at hand.  
An individual consumer is assumed to buy, at most, one unit of the product, which comes 
in two varieties—the GM product and the non-GM product. Each variety differs by the GM 
content is  ( { },i n g∈ ). We posit that either variety provides the same basic level of utility u , but 
each also produces a disutility that is proportional to the GM content level, and this disutility 
differs across consumers. Specifically, the consumer of type β  gets utility levels 
1
n nU u a s pβ= − −     if a unit of non-GM is bought 
(5) 1g gU u a pβ= − −     if a unit of GM is bought 
0 0U =      if neither variety of this product is bought 
where [ ]0,1β ∈  indexes the type of the consumer and [ ]ns E s≡  is the consumer’s expectation 
of the fraction of GM material that is present in the non-GM good.9  Whereas the parameter β  
captures the heterogeneity of consumers, vis-à-vis their preferences for the non-GM attribute, the 
parameter 0a >  captures the intensity of consumers’ aversion to GM ingredients (due, for 
example, to the subjective perception of the harm that may derive from consuming GM products). 
Thus, the aversion factors a sβ  and aβ  are directly related to the fraction of GM content present 
in the non-GM and GM products, respectively, are increasing in both arguments, and display 
positive cross effects.10  The heterogeneity of consumer preferences is represented by assuming 
                                                        
9
  Note that in this formulation we are making the simplifying assumption that consumers treat the GM 
product the same, regardless of the GM content gs  that is obtained in equilibrium (i.e., consumers behave 
as if  1gs = ). 
 
10
  Thus, the highest preference for the non-GM product is expressed by the consumer with 1β = , whereas 
for consumers with 0β = , GM and non-GM goods are perfect substitutes.  
 12 
that the individual preference parameter β  is distributed in the market according to the 
absolutely continuous distribution function ( )H β .11 
Given this preference specification, the consumer of type β  will not consume the GM 
product if 1 1( ) ( )n gp pβ β< ; he will not buy the GM product if 1 1( ) ( )n gp pβ β> ; and he will be 
indifferent between the two products if 1 1( ) ( )n gp pβ β= , where  
(6) 1 1( )n np p a sβ β≡ +  
(7) 1 1( )g gp p aβ β≡ +  
can be interpreted as the “personalized prices” of the non-GM and GM products, respectively. It 
may be useful to observe that Tirole (1988, pp. 96-97) shows that the standard setup of Mussa 
and Rosen (1978), in which quality produces a different utility level for each individual, can be 
re-formulated as the case in which quality produces the same surplus from the good but 
individuals face a personalized price which, in that setting, reflects the impact of income 
distribution (i.e., the preference parameter is isomorphic to the reciprocal of the marginal utility 
of income). Similarly, in our setting the consumer’s aversion to the GM content is conveniently 
reflected as augmenting the effective price of the two products, with the augmenting factor being 
proportional to the individual consumer preference parameter β .12  
                                                        
11
  As noted earlier, it is very common in this setting to further assume that the distribution of types is 
uniform. Whereas in this model it is always possible to presume a uniform distribution of types by simply 
redefining the variable that indexes quality, as noted by Stivers (2003) and others, such a redefinition 
affects the underlying preferences, i.e., the uniform distribution is still restrictive. Thus, we derive most of 
our results for a general distribution of types (although we do resort to the uniform distribution assumption 
to derive unambiguous comparative statics analysis).  
 
12
  One advantage of the formulation that we propose is that the personalized prices are linear in the taste 
parameter β , whereas in Tirole’s (1988) reformulation of the standard unit demand model of VPD the 
personalized price is nonlinear in the taste parameter. 
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Based on the foregoing, it follows that, for given consumer prices 1np  and 
1
gp , there 
exists a consumer type ˆβ  such that consumers of type ˆβ β<  will not purchase the non-GM 
product, whereas consumers of type ˆβ β≥  will not purchase the GM product, where13 
(8) 
1 1( )
ˆ
(1 )
n gp p
a s
β −≡
−
.  
Thus, ˆβ  denotes the type of consumer who is indifferent (at given prices) between consuming 
the GM and the non-GM product. Similarly, let β  denote the type of consumer who would be 
indifferent (at given prices) between consuming the non-GM product or nothing, and let 0β  
denote the type of consumer who would be indifferent between purchasing the GM product or 
nothing:  
(9) 
1
nu p
as
β −≡  
(10) 
1
0 gu p
a
β −≡ . 
Assuming 1 1n gp p> , the critical types { }0 ˆ, ,β β β  must be ordered either as 0 ˆβ β β< <  or as 
0 ˆβ β β≥ ≥ .  In the former case, no non-GM product will be sold and the marginal consumer 
who buys the GM good is given by { }0 ,1Min β . In the latter case, if ˆ 1β ≥ , then the market will 
be covered, and again no non-GM product will be sold, whereas finally if ˆ 1β < , then some non-
GM good will be demanded, and the marginal consumer will be { },1Min β . Figure 1 illustrates 
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 Note that the consumer will make a purchase only if ( ) ( ){ }1 1, .n gu Min p pβ β≥   Thus, for ˆβ β<  the 
consumer will buy the GM product if ( )1 ,gu p β>  whereas for ˆβ β≥  he will buy the non-GM product if 
( )1 .nu p β≥   We assume that ( )1 10g gu p p> = , guaranteeing that the market exists. 
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the case of 1β < . Then, the aggregate demand functions 1 1( , )n n gD p p  and 1 1( , )g n gD p p  for non-
GM and GM products for the case pictured in the figure are14 
(11) 
ˆ
1 1
0
ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )g n gD p p h d H
β
β β β= =∫  
(12) 1 1
ˆ
ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )n n gD p p h d H H
β
β
β β β β= = −∫


 
where ( )H β  is the distribution function of consumer types, ( ) ( )h Hβ β′≡  is the corresponding 
density function, and (without loss of generality) the mass of consumers in the market is 
normalized to one.  
 
Regulation 
Government regulation in this setting takes the particular simple form of a scalar R , which 
denotes the maximum impurity (threshold) level below which a good can be sold to consumers as 
non-GM. Thus, for example, the 0.9% EU standard discussed earlier would be equivalent to 
setting 0.009R =  in our model, whereas the 5% Japan standard would be equivalent to setting 
0.05R = . Throughout we assume that the regulation set by the government can be enforced 
costlessly. Still, a given standard R  affects the expected impurity s  of marketed non-GM 
product, given the “purification technology” discussed earlier.15  Specifically, 
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 In general, the demands can be written as:   
{ }0ˆ , ,1
1 1
0
( , ) ( )
Min
g n gD p p h d
β β
β β= ∫  
{ }
{ },1
1 1
ˆ
,1
( , ) ( )
Min
n n g
Min
D p p h d
β
β
β β= ∫

 for ˆβ β≥  and 1 1( , ) 0n n gD p p =  for ˆβ β≤ . 
 
15
 We note that the stochastic production of the high-quality good in our setting is similar to the setup 
analyzed by Stivers (2003). He considers a standard monopoly quality setting within the VPD model. 
Production of quality is stochastic, so that a distribution of quality is harvested (he provides the examples 
of timber production and diamond mining). 
 15 
(13) 
( )
0 ( )( )
R
yf y dy
s s R
F R
= ≡
∫
  
 
Pooling and Separating Equilibria 
Before considering the effects of regulation it is important to articulate the conditions that, in our 
model, govern whether a “pooling” or a “separating” equilibrium emerges. 
 
Pooling Equilibrium 
Consider first the equilibrium in which no labeling of products occurs. In this case, because 
sellers of the non-GM product have no way of differentiating their superior (but more expensive) 
product from that of the GM product, in the resulting “pooling” equilibrium only the GM product 
is sold. Because only the GM product is sold, the marketing sector’s profits are 
(14) ( )1 0Mg g g gp p Qπ η= − − . 
Assuming free entry in the marketing sector, this implies 
(15) 1 0g gp p η= + . 
Using the supply and demand functions for the GM good developed earlier, the market clearing 
condition that equates excess supply ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0g g gZ p S p D p η≡ − +  to zero requires 
(16) ( ) { }
0
,1
0
0
( ) 0
Min
gS p h d
β
β β− =∫ . 
The willingness to pay for the highest β  type is  ( ) ( )1 0ˆ ˆg gp u a p u a η= − → = − − ; if supply at 
that price is at least equal to this maximum demand, then the market will be “covered.”  Using 
(16), if ( )
1
0
( ) 0S u a h dη β β− − − ≥∫ , then the market is covered. Because maximum market size 
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is normalized to 1, and supply is the inverse marginal cost curve, this means the market is 
covered if ( )( )1 0u a Cη ′− − − ≥ .  
If the market is covered for this case, it must also be covered if the non-GM product is 
also made available, in which case total sales — and the farm price — will be independent of 
government policy. Because one of our — and society’s — concerns is how regulation affects 
producers, we assume that, absent non-GM sales, the market is not covered.  
 
Assumption 1: ( ) ( )1C u aη′ > − − . 
 
Given this assumption, from (16) the equilibrium price 0,egp  solves 
(17)  ( )
0,
0,
0
( ) 0
e
e
gS p h d
β
β β− =∫  
and the marginal buyer 0,eβ  satisfies 
(18) 
0,
0, 1
e
ge u p
a
ηβ − −= < . 
 
Separating Equilibrium 
We now analyze the case in which a labeling regime makes it possible for the processing sector to 
consider selling the higher quality non-GM good. For any lot handled at this marketing stage, the 
prices that are relevant to the processor’s decisions are the “input” prices 0np  (the farm-gate price 
of a non-GM product) and 0gp  (the farm-gate price of the GM product), and the “output” prices 
1
np  (the consumer price of the non-GM good) and 1gp  (the consumer price of the GM good). 
These prices are endogenous to the system but are taken as given by an individual processor.  
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Suppose that the marketing sector handles quantities nQ  and gQ  of farm-level output of 
non-GM and GM products, respectively. As discussed earlier, farmers will supply non-GM 
product only if 0 0n gp p> , specifically, 
(19) 0 0n gp p δ= + . 
Consequently, (expected) profit-maximizing middlemen will handle nQ  only with the intention 
of selling it as (certified) non-GM to consumers, provided 1 1n gp p> . But owing to the 
government-set standard R , only a fraction ( )F R  of non-GM farm product is expected to be sold 
as non-GM product to the consumer, and the remaining fraction [ ]1 ( )F R−  that exceeds the 
threshold level R  must be sold at the lower consumer GM product price. Hence, the marketing 
sector’s profits Mgπ  and 
M
nπ  for handling GM and non-GM products, respectively, are 
(20) ( )1 0Mg g g gp p Qπ η= − −   
(21) [ ]( )1 1 0( ) 1 ( )Mn n g n np F R p F R p Qπ η σ= + − − − − . 
In a competitive equilibrium, the marketing sector’s expected profit vanishes. Thus, if 
0M Mg nπ π= = , in an equilibrium with both products produced in strictly positive amounts, it 
must be that 
(22) 1 0g gp p η= +      
(23) [ ]1 1 0( ) 1 ( ) 0n g np F R p F R p η σ+ − − − − = . 
By using (19) and (22), the equilibrium condition in (23) can be rewritten as 
(24) 1 1 ( )n gp p F R
δ σ+
= + . 
Hence, in an equilibrium with positive production of both GM and non-GM products, the 
four prices of our model are linked by three arbitrage relations. Equation (19) specifies that the 
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farm-level price premium for non-GM product must exactly equal the cost efficiency gain δ  
provided by the new GM crop. Equation (22) specifies that, for GM product, the difference 
between the consumer price and the farm price must exactly equal the unit marketing cost η . 
And, equation (24) links the retail price premium ( )1 1n gp p−  to the effective unit efficiency 
handicap ( )δ σ+  (which includes the IP cost σ ) via the standard-dictated amount ( )F R , which 
is the fraction of farm-level non-GM product that can actually be sold as such to consumers.  
Given the three price arbitrage relations just discussed, and for a given level of the 
regulation standard R , the equilibrium value of the remaining price, 0*gp , solves the market 
equilibrium condition that is obtained by equating total supply with total demand. Several 
possible situations may arise. In particular, as is standard in models of this type with a finite 
number of heterogeneous consumers, it is necessary to distinguish the case in which all 
consumers buy one variety of the good (the market is “covered”) from the case in which some 
consumers do not buy either variety (the market is said to be “uncovered”). Furthermore, here we 
need to distinguish the case in which both varieties (GM and non-GM) are provided from that in 
which only one variety is provided16.  
Both GM and non-GM products are produced and consumed when, for the given R , the 
equilibrium price is such that ˆ0 ,1Minβ β⎡ ⎤< < ⎣ ⎦ . This situation can, of course, take the form of 
either an uncovered market (i.e., in equilibrium 1β < ) or of a covered market (i.e., in equilibrium 
1β ≥ ). The most interesting equilibrium situation, for our purposes, is when both goods are 
produced and the market is uncovered, in which case the equilibrium price 0*gp   solves 
(25) ( )0* 0*1 ( )( ) ( )g gS p H u pas R F Rδ ση⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+= − − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ . 
                                                        
16
 Assumption 1 rules out the case of a covered market if regulations are such that only GM goods are sold. 
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For the covered market case, the equilibrium price simply solves ( )0* 1gS p = .17  The other 
possible equilibria in this model include the cases 0gQ =  (i.e., no GM product is produced) and 
0nQ =  (i.e., no non-GM product is produced). Because farmers have a ceteris paribus incentive 
to produce the (more efficient) GM product, and because consumers with low enough β  will 
always want to consume this product when 1 1n gp p> , it is clear that the possibility of 0gQ =  in 
equilibrium can safely be ignored (given standard regularity conditions on the distribution of 
consumer types).18  The equilibrium with 0nQ = , on the other hand, in our model is a real 
possibility, and we analyze that next. 
 
Regulatory Standard and Equilibrium Outcomes 
We have already analyzed the case in which non-GM goods were not supplied to the market 
because there was no labeling standard that allowed consumers to differentiate them from the 
(weakly) inferior GM good. However, the presence of a labeling standard is not sufficient to 
guarantee that the non-GM good will be supplied in equilibrium. In fact, a regulatory standard 
that is “too stringent” is just as bad — in the context of bringing diversity to the marketplace — 
as a non-existent system.  
 
Proposition 1. There exists a standard level ( ]0,1R ∈  such that, in equilibrium, for R R<  the 
non-GM product is not supplied to the market, whereas for R R>  both goods are marketed in 
equilibrium. 
 
                                                        
17
  Since each consumer buys, at most, one unit, when all consumers participate, total demand is equal to 
the mass of consumers, which we have normalized to equal one.  
 
18
  We similarly can ignore the possibility that, in equilibrium, neither of the two goods is produced. 
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Proof. Let 0,eβ  denote, as earlier, the marginal buyer when there is no labeling. For a given R , 
let ˆ( )Rβ  denote the consumer who is indifferent between the GM and non-GM good (i.e.,  
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )n gp pβ β= ). If ( ) 0,ˆ eRβ β< , then introducing labeling, with this standard, will result in an 
equilibrium with both goods marketed and with a higher farm price. The latter conclusion follows 
because ( ) 0, 0,ˆ e eRβ β β β< → >  so that at the original farm price level not only will some non-
GM good be sold but more types will want to buy the product. Hence, the introduction of labeling 
leads to excess demand at 0,egp , and price must rise to clear the market. However, if ( ) 0,ˆ eRβ β≥ , 
then allowing labeling — with this standard — will not affect the equilibrium outcome since the 
introduction of the labeled good will alter neither quantity demanded nor quantity supplied at that 
price.19  Given the personalized price definitions in equations (6)-(7), and the market arbitrage 
relations (19), (22), and (24), it is readily verified that 
(26) [ ]
ˆ( ) ( ) 1 ( )R aF R s R
δ σβ +=
−
. 
It is also clear that ˆ( )Rβ  is a decreasing function of R  because  
(27) ( ) 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0( ) 1 ( )
f R R
R R
F R s R
β β ⎛ ⎞−′ = − <⎜ ⎟
−⎝ ⎠  
where we have used  
(28) [ ]/ ( )( ) ( ) 0( )
f R
s R R s R
F R
= − > . 
Now, if 0,ˆ(1) eβ β≥ , then no consumer exists that would buy the non-GM product. Otherwise, 
because we have shown that ˆ( )Rβ  is a decreasing function of R , and because 
0
ˆlim ( )R Rβ→ → ∞  (as is apparent from equation (26)), there exists a ( )0,1R ∈  such that 
                                                        
19
 It is easy to show that equilibrium is unique, since supply is positively sloped and demand is negatively 
(or not positively) sloped.  
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0,ˆ( ) eRβ β= .  Hence, if [ )0,R R∈ , ( ) 0,ˆ eRβ β< , introducing the labeled good with a standard in 
this interval will result in the same equilibrium as when no labeling occurs.  ■ 
A critical element of the foregoing proof is that (0) 0F = , i.e., perfect purity is not 
attainable ex ante. This condition reflects the often-made argument, by agricultural and food 
industry operators who deal with the emerging GM regulation, that “zero tolerance is not 
possible.”  Proposition 1 thus provides the important policy conclusion that GM labeling 
standards may go too far. Setting a standard that is too strict (i.e., a threshold level R  that is too 
low) may not help the consumer at all if the equilibrium outcome is that no non-GM product is 
supplied. The root of this result, of course, is that providing increased levels of “purity” is 
increasingly costly in this setting. 
 
Effect of the Purity Standard on Farmers’ Returns 
In the rest of the paper we consider the scenario in which it is feasible to set the regulatory 
standard such that both goods will be marketed and the regulator chooses to do so: 
 
Assumption 2: ( ) [ ]
0,ˆ 1
1 (1)
e
a s
δ σβ β+≡ <
−
 and R R>  . 
 
Even though we have previously assumed that without labeling the market was uncovered, it is 
possible that with labeling there may be a regulatory standard that would increase demand 
sufficiently so that the market would be covered. To illustrate, consider the personalized price for 
the non-GM good of the highest type ( 1β = ):  
(29) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 01n n gp p as R p V Rη= + ≡ + +  
where 
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(30) ( ) ( ) ( )V R as RF R
δ σ+
≡ + . 
Given ,R R>  it follows that we know ( ) ( )1 11 1n gp p< . Define:20 
(31) 
[ ]
( )
0,1
arg min
R
R V R
∈
=

. 
Thus, R

 represents the “best” standard for the most “GM averse” consumer. We then have the 
following. 
 
Proposition 2: If ( )( ) 1u V R C u aη′− > + > − , then there exist values of R such that the market 
is covered when labeling occurs but is uncovered otherwise. 
 
Proof: As shown earlier, ( )1C ′  is the supply (farm-gate) price needed to produce enough output 
to cover the market, and η  is the processor’s handling cost for the GM product. By Assumption 
1, the second inequality holds. ( ) ( )( )1C V Rη′ + +  is the personalized supply price for type 1β =  
when the market is covered and the regulatory standard R is used. If this price is less than 
consumers’ willingness to pay ( )u , then all agents of type 1β ≤  face a personalized price less 
than their willingness to pay, and in equilibrium the market will be covered. If 
( )( ) 1u V R C η′⎡ ⎤− < +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦

, then there is no R that can lead to a covered market.  ■ 
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 It is readily shown that ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) .( )
f RV R aR V R
F R
′ = −   Since, by assumption, ( )ˆ 1 1β < , this implies 
( )1a V> ; thus, ( ) ( )0 0 1V V′ ′< < . Further, it is readily seen that ( ) 0V R′′ >  at ( ) 0V R′ = . Hence, 
there is a unique interior value of R  that minimizes ( )V R .  
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In the following analysis, we focus on the more interesting scenario in which the market is 
uncovered (so that aggregate demand is downward sloping). We therefore make the following 
assumption. 
 
Assumption 3: ( ) ( )1 ( ) 1C V R C uη η′ ′+ + < + >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦

 
 
Thus, for any ( ],1R R∈  consumers in the interval ( )ˆ0, Rβ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  will buy the GM good, consumers 
in the interval ( ) ( )0ˆ , , gR R pβ β⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  will buy the non-GM good, and those in ( )0, ,1gR pβ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  will 
purchase neither good.  
From the earlier specification of the farm-level production, aggregate supply 0( )gS p  is an 
increasing function of 0gp , and so producer surplus is also an increasing function of 
0
gp . Relaxing 
the purity standard (i.e., increasing R ) lowers the equilibrium market price premium for the non-
GM product, which, because of (24), satisfies 1 1 ( ) ( )n gp p F Rδ σ− = + . This effect will have 
offsetting impacts on total demand and hence on the equilibrium farm price 0*gp . An increase in 
R  has an ambiguous impact on demand — by lowering the premium it increases demand, but by 
lowering the purity level it decreases demand if it raises the “personalized price” for the marginal 
(high β  type) buyer. The overall impact will depend on the individual weights put on purity and 
on the standard R. Thus, the equilibrium farm price should be a non-monotonic function of R. In 
fact, we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 3. In the uncovered market case, there exists a critical standard level psR  such that 
below this level farmers gain from relaxing the standard while above this level farmers lose. 
 
 24 
Proof. Given Assumptions 1-3, the market will be uncovered, but positive non-GM sales will 
occur for R R> . Furthermore, since producer surplus is increasing in 0gp , it is clear that 
producers want to maximize 0gp , which entails choosing the standard that maximizes sales. The 
equilibrium price ( )0*gp R  is determined from 
(32) ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0* 0*, , 0g g gZ p R S p H R pβ= − =  
implying 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
0
,
g
g
u p
F R
R p
as R
δ ση
β
+
− − −
≡ . 
As noted, ( ) ( )0 0g gS p p′= Π , where ( )0gpΠ  is total farmers’ profits. Further, 
(33)  
0*
0*
g
g
dp Z R
dR Z p
−∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
 
where 0* 0gZ p∂ ∂ >  (supply and demand have their conventional slopes). Also: 
(34)  ( )( )0, gZ h R pR Rββ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞ = −⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠

 
where ( ) ( )0( ) ˆ( ) 1 ( ) ( , ) ( )( ) ( ) g
f R R s R R p R s R
R F R s R
β β β∂ ⎡ ⎤≡ − − −⎣ ⎦∂
 
. 
At ( )0,, egR p , ( ) ( ) ( )0, 0 0,ˆ , ,e eg gR R p R pβ β β= = , so that ( ) ( )0,*0 0gR RR p Rβ∂ ∂ > → ∂ ∂ > . Thus, 
demand and equilibrium price are increasing in R at R . However, at 1R = , 
(35) ( ) ( )0
1
(1)
ˆ(1) 1 (1) (1, ) 1 (1) 0(1) gR
f
s p s
R s
β β β
=
∂ ⎡ ⎤≡ − − − <⎣ ⎦∂
 
. 
Hence, the regulatory standard psR  that maximizes producer surplus must satisfy ( ),1psR R∈ . 
Indeed, the foregoing analysis establishes that psR  solves 
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(36) ( ) ( )ˆ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0PS PS PS PS PSR s R R R s Rβ β− − − =  .   ■ 
Thus, Proposition 3 establishes the interesting conclusion that some regulation, in the 
form of a minimum quality standard defining what can be identified as “non-GM,” may be 
desirable from the producers’ perspective, even though in any equilibrium with positive 
production of both goods farmers are actually indifferent as to which good to produce. The 
quality standard here helps to exploit optimally consumers’ preference for product differentiation. 
A corollary to this result is that the absence of a standard (or, equivalently, 1R = ) is generally not 
in the interest of agricultural producers. 
 
Welfare Effect of the Purity Standard 
In the model that we have developed there is no profit at the marketing level, because marketing 
services are provided at constant unit costs (i.e., by a constant returns-to-scale industry), but the 
purity standard has the potential to affect the welfare of farmers and of final consumers. Having 
discussed the qualitative impact on producer surplus in the preceding section, let us now turn to 
aggregate welfare. Summing producer and aggregate consumer surplus, for a given pair 0( , )gp R  
the welfare function is 
(37) 
ˆ
0 0 0 0
ˆ0
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )g g g g n gW p R p U p R h d U p R h d
β β
β
β β β β= Π + +∫ ∫

 
where 0( )gpΠ  is the producer surplus; that is, 
(38) 
0
0
0
( ) ( )
gp
gp S p dpΠ ≡ ∫  
and the individual utility functions that enter aggregate consumer surplus are 
(39) 0 0( , )g g gU p R u p aη β= − − −  
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(40) 0 0( , ) ( )( )n g gU p R u p a s RF R
δ ση β+= − − − −  
where we have used the arbitrage equilibrium relations 0 0n gp p δ= + , 1 0g gp p η= + , and 
( ) ( )1 1n gp p F Rδ σ= + + . Let *R  denote the standard that maximizes the welfare function in 
(37). Then *R  exists by virtue of Weierstrass’s theorem,21 and for an interior solution it satisfies 
0* *( , ) 0gW p R R∂ ∂ = , where 0*gp  is the equilibrium price, which therefore must satisfy 
0* * 0( , ) 0g gW p R p∂ ∂ = 22.  
 Differentiating the welfare function in equation (37), we obtain  
(41) 
0* *
0* 0*
0 * *
,
1 ( )( ) 0( ) ( )
g
g g
g p R
W p H u p
p as R F R
δ ση⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∂ +′= Π − − − − =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
(42) ( )
*
0* *
*
*
* *
* *
, ˆ
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
gp R
W f R
a R s R h d
R F R F R
β
β
δ σ β β β⎛ ⎞∂ += − − =⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠∫

 
where the limits of integration satisfy * *ˆ ˆ( )Rβ β=  and * *( )Rβ β=  . Note that the condition in 
(41) is equivalent to the equilibrium condition in (25) because Hotelling’s lemma implies 
0 0( ) ( )g gp S p′Π = . 
It is possible to characterize this welfare-maximizing standard relative to the standard 
PSR  that is optimal from the producers’ perspective. In particular, we find the following. 
 
Proposition 4. The welfare-maximizing regulatory level is such that * PSR R> . That is, 
consumers prefer a more lax regulatory standard than do producers.  
                                                        
21
  The problem involves the maximization of a continuous function defined over a compact set (the unit 
interval). 
 
22
  Note that, for any given R, the competitive equilibrium price minimizes the sum of producer and 
consumer surplus, for reasons similar to those articulated in Smith (1963).  
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Proof. The condition for the welfare-maximizing optimal standard *R in equation (42) can be 
rewritten as 
(43) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
*
*
* * * * *
ˆ
ˆ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0J R R s R R s R h d
β
β
β β β β≡ − − − =∫

. 
Evaluating this function at the standard psR  that maximizes producer surplus, which solves 
equation (36), we obtain 
(44) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ
( ) ( ) ( ) 0ps ps ps psJ R R R s R h d
β
β
β β β β≡ − − >∫


 
where the limits of integration here are ˆ ˆ( )psRβ β=  and ( )psRβ β=  . This result, together with 
the fact that the sufficient conditions for welfare maximization require ( )* 0J R′ < , establishes 
that * psR R> . ■ 
 
The fact that producers prefer a stricter standard than do consumers may be a bit 
surprising, especially in light of the fact that the regulation of GM labeling is commonly 
understood as a response to consumers’ concerns. To a certain extent this result reflects the 
special features of the unit demand assumption that underlies the Mussa-Rosen model of demand 
for quality (but note that our result has been derived without any restriction on the distribution of 
consumer types).23 Still, especially when considered along with our Proposition 1, the result in 
Proposition 4 does provide a further check on the simplistic approach that seems to underpin 
much of the discussion concerning GM labeling policies in the EU and elsewhere, whereby the 
observation that (some) consumers are averse to the presence of GM content in food is invoked to 
justify very strict regulations. But any reasonable analysis of this situation must grant the premise 
                                                        
23
  Insofar as that is the case, the result is a reminder that the Mussa-Rosen model of differentiated demand 
remains a particular specification (albeit a very useful one) of a general class of preferences.  
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that consumers are really heterogeneous in their aversion to GM content, as reflected in the model 
that we have developed here. Hence, the notion of “consumers’ welfare” in this setting is really 
about some “average” consumer. In particular, in moving from psR  to *R , not all consumers 
benefit from such a relaxation of the purity standards, although aggregate consumer surplus does 
increase.  
The reason producers prefer a tighter standard than do consumers (on average) may be 
understood as follows. As previously discussed, an increase in R  has two offsetting effects. It 
increases the number of lots accepted, as raising R  lowers — by the same amount for everybody 
— the actual market price of the non-GM good. At the same time, this loosening of standards 
raises the expected GM content of approved goods, which hurts high β  types the most. Since 
each person buys, at most, one unit, the producer wants to choose R to make the highest possible 
β  type participate; thus, at psR  the standard is chosen so that, for this highest participating type 
β , the two effects offset and therefore the “personalized” price for type β  is minimized. But 
this implies that every consumer of type ( )ˆ,β β β∈   would benefit by an infinitesimal weakening 
of the standard; hence, * psR R> . At the consumer optimum, a marginal increase in R would 
benefit some consumers and hurt others, so that average consumer surplus would be unchanged. 
At the welfare optimum, of course, aggregate consumer surplus is still increasing in R, while 
producer surplus is decreasing in R.  
It is also useful to note that the result in Proposition 4 is distinct from a seemingly similar 
finding of the minimum quality standard literature, where it also emerges that a standard 
collectively set by producers may be too strict. That result actually reflects the exercise of 
monopoly power, whereby returns to producers may increase with reduced marketed quantities, 
and in such models one of the effects of a stricter standard is in fact that of reducing the quantity 
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supplied by producers (e.g., Leland, 1979). Here, by contrast, competitive conditions are 
maintained and producers supply both goods to the market.  
 
Comparative Statics of Equilibrium 
Having characterized the optimality conditions for the optimal purity standard, we wish to 
investigate how this level is affected by some of the model’s critical parameters. To get 
unambiguous results, however, here we have to restrict the analysis by assuming that the 
distribution of consumer types ( )H β  is uniform, which means that [ ]( ) 1, 0,1h β β= ∀ ∈ .24 Our 
findings are summarized in the following. 
 
Proposition 5. Assuming uniform distribution of types, the welfare-maximizing purity standard 
*R  and equilibrium price 0*gp  satisfy the following comparative statics properties:  
(i) * 0R σ∂ ∂ >  and 0* 0gp σ∂ ∂ < ;   
(ii) * 0R δ∂ ∂ >  and 0* 0gp δ∂ ∂ < ;  
(iii) * 0R a∂ ∂ <  and 0* 0gp a∂ ∂ < ;  
(iv) * 0R u∂ ∂ <  and 0* 0gp u∂ ∂ > ; and  
(v)  * 0R η∂ ∂ >  and 0* 0gp η∂ ∂ < . 
 
Details of the proof are reported in the Appendix. Thus, the optimal purity level *R  should be 
sensitive to the costliness of the required segregation activities (even if, as in our formulation, the 
unit segregation cost σ  is itself independent of the required purity level set by the government). 
                                                        
24
  Whereas the assumption of uniform distribution of types is somewhat restrictive, it is routinely made in 
papers that study quality with the Mussa-Rosen setup (e.g., Scarpa, 1998; Valletti, 2000; Stivers, 2003; 
Fulton and Giannakas, 2004). 
 
 30 
Specifically, as segregation becomes costlier (σ  increases) the optimal impurity level *R  
increases (and the equilibrium farm price declines). Exactly the same qualitative effects apply to 
an increase in the size of the efficiency gains due to the GM innovation (an increase in δ ). On 
the other hand, as the population of consumers becomes more averse to GM content (as measured 
by an increase in the parameter a ), the optimal standard *R  should be tightened (and the 
equilibrium farm price is reduced because of the negative demand effect). An increase in the base 
willingness to pay for the two goods (the parameter u ) obviously increases the equilibrium farm 
price and should also result in a tightening of the optimal standard *R . This comparative statics 
effect is amenable to an interesting interpretation if we note that, in this context, the parameter u  
is inversely related to the (absolute) value of the elasticity of total demand. Hence, this result 
suggests that tighter purity standards (i.e., lower *R ) should be associated with foods that have a 
more inelastic demand. Finally, the comparative statics effect of the parameter η  (the unit costs 
of marketing services) illustrates the intuitive conclusion that an increase in the cost of marketing 
depresses the equilibrium farm price and should also result in a laxer optimal standard *R .  
 
Concluding Remarks  
In this paper we developed a framework of analysis for a critical economic issue that arises in the 
pursuit of a credible and enforceable system of IP and labeling for GM and non-GM products, 
namely, the setting of a standard for “non-GM” products. The model represents three stages in the 
supply chain: farm production, marketing handlers, and final users. The possibility of accidental 
co-mingling of non-GM products is modeled at the marketing stage. Regulation takes the form of 
a threshold level of purity for non-GM products. Uncertainty is modeled explicitly, and the 
equilibrium solution includes a novel specification of the demand for (vertically) differentiated 
GM and non-GM products that is particularly useful in the stochastic framework of this paper.  
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The results of the model are quite interesting and showed that even in a competitive 
setting where agents have no scope for strategic behavior, government regulation of the labeling 
of GM products still presents a meaningful problem. We showed that there exists a welfare-
maximizing standard for products that claim a non-GM status, and this welfare standard has 
intuitive comparative statics properties. In particular, the lack of any standard leads to a pooling 
equilibrium whereby only the GM product is produced, which is typically suboptimal from a 
welfare perspective. Similarly, a standard that is too strict (i.e., high purity of the non-GM 
product) may also lead to a collapse of the market for the non-GM product. In addition, we 
showed that the labeling standard that is optimal from society’s viewpoint typically differs from 
the standard that would be preferred by farmers. Somewhat surprisingly, the standard that farmers 
would prefer is actually stricter than what society would find optimal. 
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Appendix — Proof of Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics Results) 
With a uniform distribution of types ( )H β β= , and thus in the uncovered market when both 
GM and non-GM products are produced, market demands are, respectively, ˆgD β=  and 
ˆ
nD β β= − , so that total demand is T n gD D D β≡ + =  . Upon recalling the arbitrage relations of 
competitive equilibrium, that is, 
 
 
0 0
n gp p δ= +  
 
1 0
g gp p η= +      
 ( )1 1 ( )n gp p F R δ σ− = +  
 
we have  
0
( )( ) ( )
gu p F RR
as R
δ ση
β
+
− − −
≡  
 
[ ]
ˆ( ) ( ) 1 ( )R aF R s R
δ σβ +=
−
. 
 
In what follows we simplify notation and omit the functional dependence on R  by writing 
( )F R F= , ( )f R f=  and ( )s R s= . Also, we define k δ σ≡ + , 0gA u p η≡ − − , and 0gP p≡ , so 
that    
 
ˆ
(1 )
k
Fa s
β =
−
 
 
AF k
Fas
β −= . 
   
Aggregate consumer surplus here is 2 21 ˆ (1 )
2
CS a s sβ β⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦ . Substituting and simplifying 
obtains 
 
2 2
1
2 (1 )
k kA
F FCS
a s s
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
−⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥
= +⎢ ⎥
−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
Hence, the welfare function is  
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2 2
1( )
2 (1 )
k kA
F FW P
a s s
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
−⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥
= Π + +⎢ ⎥
−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
   
 
where ( )PΠ  is producer surplus. The optimality conditions for welfare maximization (yielding 
the optimal standard purity *R  and the competitive farm-level equilibrium price *P ) are 
 
(45) 1( ) 0P
kA
FW P
a s
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
′= Π − =  
 
(46) 
2 2 2
2
2 2
2 2
1 ( ) ( ) 0
2 (1 ) (1 )R
k k k k f kA f A f fF F F F FFW R s R s
a s F s Fs s
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
− −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥
= − − − + − =⎢ ⎥
−
−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
Upon substitution and simplification we obtain 
 
(47)
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1 (1 ) 0 1 (1 ) 02R afW s R R s s R R sF β β β β β β⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − − − = → − + − − − =⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠    . 
 
Consider now the comparative statics effect of the parameter k σ δ≡ + . Differentiating the 
optimality conditions in (45) and (46) and expressing the results in matrix form yields 
 
k RkRR RP
k PkPR PP
R WW W
P WW W
−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
. 
 
Solving by Cramer’s rule obtains 
 
1 Rk RP Rk PP Pk RP
k
Pk PP
W W W W W W
R
W W
−
− +
= =
−Δ Δ
 
 
1 RR Rk RR Pk PR Rk
k
PR Pk
W W W W W W
P
W W
−
− +
= =
−Δ Δ
 
 
where 0RR RP
PR PP
W W
W W
Δ = < ,  0RRW <   and 0PPW >   by the second-order conditions of the 
welfare optimization problem (saddle point).  
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We now compute the partial effects that enter these comparative statics expressions. 
Differentiating the optimality conditions in (45) and (46) yields 
2 2
1 1 ( )PR
kA
k f fFW R s
a s a FF s
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= − + −  
 
which can be simplified to  
 
ˆ(1 ) ( )PR
fW s R s
Fs
β β⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Evaluating this partial effect at the optimality conditions, such that (47) holds, we obtain 
 
ˆ(1 ) 0PR
fW R
Fs
β= − > . 
 
Next, differentiating (45) we find 
 
1 0PkW
aFs
= > . 
 
And differentiating (46) we obtain 
 
( ) ( )3 2 3 2 2
1 1 1( ( )(1 ) (1 )Rk
kf k k f k fW A fs f R s R s
a F s FF s F F sFs
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − + − + − − + −⎜ ⎟
−
−⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
which simplifies to 
 
( )22 1 ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )Rk fW R s s s Rs sF β β⎡ ⎤= − − − + −⎣ ⎦−  . 
 
Evaluating this partial effect at the optimality conditions, such that (47) holds, we obtain 
 
[ ] 2
2
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )1
ˆ
(1 ) ( )kR
R R s s R s s sfW
s s R sF
β ⎡ ⎤− − − − + −= ⎢ ⎥
− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 
Thus, a sufficient condition for 0kRW >  is (1 ) ( )R s s R s− ≥ − , which does hold because R s≥  
and 1R ≤ . Hence, we conclude that 0kRW > .  
 
The foregoing partial effects allow us to sign the comparative statics effect on farm price: 
 
0RR Pk PR Rkk
W W W W
P
−
= <
−Δ
. 
 
But ( ) ( )k Rk PP Pk RPsign R sign W W W W= − . Note that 
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0 1( )PP gW p
as
′′= Π + . 
 
Because 0 0( ) ( ) 0g gp S p′′ ′Π = >  (the profit function is convex) and 0RkW > , to conclude that 
0kR >  it suffices to show that 
1 0Rk Pk RPZ W W W
as
≡ − ≥ . From earlier derivations, 
 
[ ] 2
2
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )1 1 1
ˆ ˆ(1 )(1 ) ( )
R R s s R s s sf fZ R
s s R s as aFs FsF
β β⎡ ⎤− − − − + −≡ − −⎢ ⎥
− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
which can be simplified to yield 
 
2 2
2 2
1 1 (1 ) (1 )
ˆ 0( )(1 )
f s R s sZ
a R sF s s
β ⎡ ⎤− + −= >⎢ ⎥
−
− ⎣ ⎦
 
 
and so we can conclude that 0kR > . Recalling that k δ σ≡ + , we have therefore established 
parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4.  
 
The comparative statics analysis for the parameter k  is readily adapted to the comparative statics 
of the “GM aversion” parameter a . Specifically, 
 
Ra PP Pa RP
a
W W W W
R
−
=
−Δ
 
 
RR Pa PR Ra
a
W W W W
P
−
=
−Δ
. 
 
The partial effects of interest here are 
 
( )21 1 0PaW AF k aa Fs β= − = >

 
 
1 0Ra RW W
a
= − =  
 
and so we find 
 
0RR Paa
W W
P = <
−Δ
 
 
0Pa RPa
W W
R
−
= <
−Δ
   
 
which establishes part (iii) of Proposition 4. 
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Finally, concerning the parameters u  and η , we note that they enter the problem only through 
the term 0gA u p η≡ − − . For the comparative statics of this term we have 
 
RA PP PA RP
A
W W W W
R
−
=
−Δ
 
 
RR PA PR RA
A
W W W W
P
−
=
−Δ
. 
 
The partial effects of interest here are 
 
1 0PAW
as
= − <  
 
and 0RAW <  because RA PRW W= −  and we showed earlier that 0PRW > . Thus we can 
immediately conclude that 0AP > . The sign of AR  is the sign of  ( )RA PP PA RPZ W W W W≡ − . By 
using RA PRW W= −  we find ( )RA PP PAZ W W W≡ + , and by noting that 0( )PP g PAW p W′′= Π −  we 
get  0( ) 0RA gZ W p′′≡ Π < , and so we conclude that 0AR < . Recalling again that 0gA u p η≡ − − , 
this concludes the comparative statics of parameters u  and η  (part (iv) of Proposition 5). 
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Figure 1. Heterogeneous preferences for quality and unit demand  
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